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CIVIL PROCEDURE²REASSESSING PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN 
ARKANSAS AND THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT AFTER GOODYEAR DUNLOP TIRES 
OPERATIONS V. BROWN, 131 S. CT. 2846 (2011) AND J. MCINTYRE 
MACHINERY, LTD. V. NICASTRO, 131 S. CT. 2780 (2011). 
I. INTRODUCTION
Morass,1 labyrinth,2 muddied,3 DQGD³ULGGOHZUDSSHGLQDP\VWHU\Ln-
VLGHDQHQLJPD´4 Courts and commentators have long employed such color-
ful language to describe the confusing and complex arena of personal-
jurisdiction jurisprudence. Its persistently jumbled state prompted the Su-
preme Court of the United States to consider and hand down two decisions5
on personal jurisdiction in June 2011. As its first pronouncement on person-
al jurisdiction in more than two decades, the Court disappointed many who 
have awaited a workable standard to assess the proper limits of procedural 
due process in the modern commercial world. In Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown,6 a unanimous Court reversed a North Carolina 
DSSHOODWHFRXUW¶VILQGLQJRIJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQRYHUforeign subsidiaries of 
a multi-QDWLRQDO$PHULFDQWLUHPDQXIDFWXUHUGHFLGLQJWKDWWKHVXEVLGLDULHV¶
FRQWDFWVLQQRZD\UHQGHUHGWKHP³DWKRPH´LQ1RUWK&DUROLQD7 In the com-
panion case, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,8 a fractured Court 
failed to SURGXFH DPDMRULW\ RSLQLRQ EXW RYHUWXUQHG D1HZ -HUVH\ FRXUW¶V
exercise of personal jurisdiction over a British company whose metal-
shearing machine injured a worker in the forum state.9
In the wake of Goodyear and Nicastro, Arkansas courts and practition-
ers have begun to grapple with their proper interpretation, as well as their 
1. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F.2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1930) (³It is quite 
impossible to establish any rule from the decided cases [on personal jurisdiction]; we must 
step from tuft to tuft across the morass.´). 
2. Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 531, 531 (1995). 
3. Packerware Corp. v. B & R Plastics, Inc., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1078 (D. Kan. 1998) 
(referring to stream-of-commerce theory). 
4. Donatelli v. Nat¶l Hockey League, 893 F.2d 459, 462 (1st Cir. 1990). 
5. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
6. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011). 
7. Id. at 2857. 
8. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
9. Id., 131 S. Ct. at 2788±91 (plurality opinion). Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, 
concurred in the judgment only. Id. at 2791±94 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Kagan and Sotomayor, dissented. Id. at 2794±95 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting). 
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precedential value, especially within the context of personal jurisdiction 
over a foreign10 manufacturer. In a case of first impression, the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas provided an overview of Goodyear EXW WKH ³DW-KRPH´
test factored little into its decision.11 Similarly, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit relied primarily on existing precedent instead 
of Goodyear to decide its only post-Goodyear case to date.12 Neither the 
Arkansas courts nor the Eighth Circuit have yet had the occasion to consider 
the implications of Nicastro on existing specific-jurisdiction jurisprudence. 
But when confronted with the case, the Eighth Circuit will have to reconcile 
its precedent with the Nicastro plurality, as they stand in direct conflict with 
each other. 
While it is clear that the personal-jurisdiction landscape is evolving in 
Arkansas and the Eighth Circuit, the question remains as to the extent of that 
evolution following Goodyear and Nicastro.13 This note will provide insight 
into that answer, assessing the current applications of Goodyear and the 
potential impact²if any²Nicastro may have. 
Part I of this note will provide an overview of the modern-day mini-
mum-contacts test, fRFXVLQJ RQ WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V JHQHUDO-jurisdiction 
jurisprudence leading up to and including Goodyear, as well as its specific-
jurisdiction jurisprudence within the context of the stream-of-commerce 
analysis following Asahi Metal Industry, Co. v. Superior Court of Califor-
nia, Solano County14 and Nicastro.15 Part II will examine both the Supreme 
Court of Arkansas¶s DQG WKH(LJKWK&LUFXLW¶VGHQLDORIJHQHUDO MXULVGLFWLRQ
over foreign manufacturers and the impact of Goodyear, arguing that its 
effect is minimal DQG VHUYHV SULPDULO\ WR UHDIILUP WKH FRXUWV¶QDUURZ FRn-
struction of general jurisdiction.16 This part will conclude by examining the 
(LJKWK&LUFXLW¶V SUH-Nicastro stream-of-commerce precedent and other ju-
10. This note uses the word ³foreign´ to mean a country other than the United States, 
although it can also mean a non-resident of a particular state. 
11. Yanmar Co. Ltd. v. Slater, 2012 Ark. 36, 386 S.W.3d 439. 
12. Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., 646 F.3d 589 (8th Cir. 
2011). 
13. The issue of piercing the corporate veil of a foreign-parent company based on its 
subsidiaries¶ activities in the forum state for the purposes of conferring general jurisdiction is 
beyond the scope of this note. The Supreme Court did not reach the issue in Goodyear be-
cause it had not been argued in the prior proceedings and had not been raised in the parents¶
brief in opposition to the petition for certiorari. 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857 (2011). As such, the 
Eighth Circuit¶s precedent remains unaffected. See Viasystems, 646 F.3d at 596±97 (8th Cir. 
2011) (reiterating the circuit court¶s alter-ego test for personal jurisdiction based on the activ-
ities of a nonresident corporation¶s in-state subsidiary without reference to Goodyear). The 
Supreme Court of Arkansas similarly relied on the Eighth Circuit¶s existing test in its most 
recent consideration of the issue. See Yanmar, 2012 Ark. at 11±13, 386 S.W.3d at 447±48. 
14. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
15. See infra Part II.A±C. 
16. See infra Part III.A±B. 
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ULVGLFWLRQV¶WUHDWPHQWRINicastro, noting that lower courts have significantly 
tempered the impact of the plurality opinion.17 Finally, this note closes by 
arguing that the Eighth Circuit should follow the trend among other jurisdic-
tions and continue to adhere to its pre-Nicastro, pure stream-of-commerce 
precedent, as it best comports with the realities of global commerce while 
remaining faithful to the fairness principles at the core of personal jurisdic-
tion doctrine.18
II. BACKGROUND
3HUVRQDO MXULVGLFWLRQ LV WKH FRXUW¶V SRZHU WR HQWHU MXGJPHQW DJDLQVW D
particular defendant.19 Historically, this power derived from territorial 
ERXQGDULHVPHDQLQJDFRXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQDODXWKRULW\H[WHQGHGRQO\WRSHr-
sons and property within the state in which the court sat.20 The increasing 
mobility of American society, however, necessitated an expansion of the 
limited jurisdictional bases. Today, personal jurisdiction is limited only by 
the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and state long-arm 
statutes, which authorize jurisdiction in a particular forum.21
Modern constitutional limitations on personal jurisdiction originate 
from International Shoe v. Washington.22 In International Shoe, the Su-
preme Court established that a state court could assert personal jurisdiction 
over a foreign defendant based upon its having minimum contacts with the 
forum state.23 In other words, although a defendant does not reside in the 
forum state, it may conduct activities there, and those activities, in turn, may 
create a substantial relationship with the state such that it subjects itself to 
WKHFRXUW¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ6R ORQJDV WKRVHPLQLPXPFRQWDFWVH[LVWKDOLQJD
GHIHQGDQW LQWR FRXUW GRHV QRW RIIHQG ³WUDGLWLRQDO QRWLRQV RI IDLU SOD\ DQG
VXEVWDQWLDOMXVWLFH´24
While International Shoe¶V minimum-contacts test provides the basic 
framework for analyzing personal jurisdiction, the Court has since devel-
oped other factors germane to its proper application; chief among them is 
the purposeful-availment requirement. Thus, the nonresident defendant must 
FRPPLW³VRPHDFWE\ZKLFK>LW@SXUSRVHIXlly avails itself of the privilege of 
17. See infra Part III.C±D. 
18. See infra Part III.E. 
19. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 71 (10th ed. 2009). 
20. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 722±24 (1877). Pennoyer also established that con-
sent and personal service within the forum are appropriate bases for exercising personal ju-
risdiction. Id. at 720. 
21. Friedenthal, supra note 19. 
22. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
23. Id. at 319±20. 
24. Id. at 316. 
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conducting activities within the forum [s]tate, thus invoking the benefits and 
SURWHFWLRQVRILWVODZV´25 The purposeful-availment requirement focuses on 
WKHGHIHQGDQW¶VGHOLEHUDWHDFWLYLWLHVZLWKLQWKHIRUXPVWDWHHQsuring that it 
ZLOOQRWEHKDOHGLQWRFRXUWDVDUHVXOWRI³µUDQGRP¶µIRUWXLWRXV¶RUµDWWHQu-
DWHG¶FRQWDFWV´26 7KXVZKHQWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VGHOLEHUDWHDFWLRQVJLYHULVHWR
its connection with the forum state, jurisdiction over the defendant is gener-
ally proper.27
(YHQ LI WKH GHIHQGDQW KDV WKH UHTXLVLWHPLQLPXP FRQWDFWV ³IDLU SOD\
DQGVXEVWDQWLDOMXVWLFH´FRQWHPSODWHWKDWH[HUWLQJSHUVRQDOMXULVGLFWLRQPD\
still be improper if it would be unfair or unreasonable to the defendant.28
The Court has recognized a number of considerations pertinent to that in-
TXLU\LQFOXGLQJWKHVWDWH¶VLQWHUHVWLQDGMXGLFDWLQJWKHFDVH WKHSDUWLHV¶Ln-
terests in proceeding with the case in a particular forum and obtaining relief, 
WKH VWDWH¶V LQWHUHVW LQ SURYLGLQJ D IRUXP IRU UHGUHVV for its citizens and 
providing efficient resolution of controversies, the burden upon the defend-
DQWLQPDLQWDLQLQJWKHVXLWLQWKHIRUXPDQGWKHVWDWHV¶LQWHUHVWLQIXUWKHULQJ
essential social policies.29 Balancing these fairness factors against the de-
fendDQW¶VPLQLPXPFRQWDFWVSURWHFWVWKHGHIHQGDQWIURPOLWLJDWLQJLQDGLs-
tant or inconvenient forum in violation of due process. 
International Shoe also laid the groundwork for the splintering of per-
sonal jurisdiction into two branches: specific and general jurisdiction.30
*HQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQLVEDVHGRQWKH³FRQWLQXRXVDQGV\VWHPDWLF´FRQWDFWVRI
the defendant apart from the subject of the litigation, whereas specific juris-
GLFWLRQ UHTXLUHV WKH VXEMHFWRI WKH OLWLJDWLRQ WRDULVHRXWRI WKHGHIHQGDQW¶V
contacts with the forum state.31 Complicating matters further, specific juris-
diction has spawned a unique subset of cases. In World-Wide Volkswagen v. 
Woodson,32 WKH&RXUWUHFRJQL]HGWKDWDIRUXP³GRHVQRWH[FHHGLWVSRZHUV
under the Due Process Clause if it asserts personal jurisdiction over a corpo-
ration that delivers its products into the stream of commerce with the expec-
25. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (citing Int¶l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945)). 
26. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475±76 (1985) (citing Keeton v. 
Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 
444 U.S. 286 (1980)).
27. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475±76. 
28. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 300 (Brennan J., dissenting) (quoting ,QW¶O
Shoe, 326 U.S. 310). 
29. Id. at 300±01.  
30. ,QW¶O6KRH, 326 U.S. at 317, 319 (Brennan J., dissenting); Helicopteros Nacionales de 
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8±9 (1984). The Helicopteros Court adopted 
the terminology from Arthur von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman¶s influential article, Juris-
diction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136±45 (1966). 
31. Int¶l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317, 319. 
32. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 286. 
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WDWLRQWKDWWKH\ZLOOEHSXUFKDVHGE\FRQVXPHUVLQWKHIRUXPVWDWH´33 This 
stream-of-commerce branch of specific jurisdiction is particularly applicable 
to products-liability cases, in which it is used to assess the indirect, but actu-
al, contacts of a foreign manufacturer that uses a distribution chain to dis-
seminate its goods in the United States. 
Against this backdrop, the Supreme Court, as well as lower courts, has 
struggled to define the constitutional contours of general and specific juris-
diction, especially with regard to stream-of-commerce theory. This section 
traces the ongoing evolution of both general jurisdiction34 and the stream-of-
commerce branch of specific jurisdiction,35 FXOPLQDWLQJ ZLWK WKH &RXUW¶V
latest attempts to clarify their proper constitutional scope in Goodyear36 and 
Nicastro.37
A.  7KH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V*HQHUDO-XULVGLFWLRQ-XULVSUXGHQFH%HIRUHGood-
year 
As noted previously, the e[HUFLVH RI JHQHUDO MXULVGLFWLRQ LV ³GLVSXWH-
EOLQG´PHDQLQJWKDWLWLVSUHPLVHGRQWKHQDWXUHDQGTXDOLW\RIWKHGHIHQd-
DQW¶V UHODWLRQVKLS ZLWK WKH IRUXP VWDWH ZLWKRXW UHJDUG WR WKH XQGHUO\LQJ
claim.38 In International Shoe, Justice Brennan posited what subsequently 
became the amorphous test for general jurisdiction, namely whether the de-
IHQGDQW¶VFRQWDFWVZLWKWKHIRUXPDUH³VRVXEVWDQWLDODQGRIVXFKDQDWXUHDV
to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely 
distinct from thosHDFWLYLWLHV´39 Since International Shoe, the Court has had 
RQO\ WZR RFFDVLRQV WR DSSO\ DQG LQWHUSUHW WKH ³FRQWLQXRXV DQG V\VWHPDWLF
FRQWDFWV´WHVWIRUJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQ 40 In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated 
Mining Company,41 it considered whether an Ohio court could properly ex-
ercise general jurisdiction over a company based in the Philippines, and in 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,42 it considered whether 
33. Id. at 297±98. 
34. See infra Part II.A. 
35. See infra Part II.C. 
36. See infra Part II.B. 
37. See infra Part II.D. 
38. Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 610 
(1988). 
39. Int¶l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (citing Mo., Kan. & Tex. 
Ry. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921)). 
40. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011) 
(acknowledging that since International Shoe, the Court has considered twice whether an out-
of-state corporate defendant¶s in-state contacts were sufficiently continuous and systematic to 
justify the exercise of general jurisdiction over claims unrelated to those contacts). 
41. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
42. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
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a Texas court could maintain general jurisdiction over a Columbian compa-
ny. The two cases would come to represent extreme opposite ends of the 
general jurisdiction spectrum, leaving lower courts to consider cases in the 
middle with little guidance as to what contacts warrant exerting general ju-
risdiction. 
1. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 
(1952).
In Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., the Court relied on the 
GHIHQGDQW¶V DFWLYLWLHV LQ WKH IRUXPVWDWHRI2KLR WRXSKROG WKH H[HUFLVHRI
general jurisdiction.43 Mrs. Perkins, a stockholder in the defendant mining 
company, sued in Ohio to recover dividends owed to her and damages for 
WKHFRPSDQ\¶VIDLOXUHWRLVVXHKHUVWRFNFHUWLILFDWHV44 Benguet Mining main-
tained its facilities in the Philippines but had ceased its operations due to the 
Japanese occupation of the islands during World War II.45 During the occu-
SDWLRQKRZHYHU WKHFRPSDQ\¶VSUHVLGHQWUHWXUQHGKRPHWR2KLRDQGFRn-
WLQXHGWRFRQGXFWEXVLQHVVWKHUHRQWKHFRPSDQ\¶VEHKDOI46 From the Ohio 
office, the company president corresponded with employees and others re-
garding company business, issued paychecks, setup and used two bank ac-
counts in Ohio for the company, worked with an Ohio-based transfer agent 
IRUFRPSDQ\VWRFNKHOGGLUHFWRUV¶PHHWLQJVDQGVXSHUYLVHGDQGSDLGIRUWKH
rHKDELOLWDWLRQRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VSURSHUWLHVLQWKH3KLOLSSLQHV47
Based on these facts, the Court concluded that the company president 
³FDUULHGRQ LQ2KLR D FRQWLQXRXV DQG V\VWHPDWLF VXSHUYLVLRQRI WKHQHFHs-
VDULO\OLPLWHGZDUWLPHDFWLYLWLHVRIWKHFRPSDQ\´48 Despite the lack of com-
SDQ\SURSHUW\LQWKHVWDWHWKH&RXUWUHDVRQHG³PDQ\RILWVZDUWLPHDFWLYi-
ties were directed from Ohio and were being given the personal attention of 
LWVSUHVLGHQWLQWKDW>V@WDWHDWWKHWLPHKHZDVVHUYHGZLWKVXPPRQV´49 Thus, 
while LQFRUSRUDWHG DEURDG WKH FRPSDQ\¶V ORFDWLRQ DQG DFWLYLWLHV LQ 2KLR
during the war persuaded the Court that personal jurisdiction comported 
with due process.50
43. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 446 (1952). 
44. Id. at 439. 
45. Id. at 447. 
46. Id. at 448. 
47. Id.
48. Id. 
49. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448. 
50. Id.
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2. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 
(1984). 
More than three decades later, the Supreme Court expressly labeled the 
theoretical underpinnings of Perkins DV ³JHQHUDO MXULVGLFWLRQ´51 In 
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, the Court assessed the 
contacts of a Columbia-based helicopter transportation corporation 
³+HOLFRO´ZLWKWKHIRUXPVWDWHRI7H[DVZKHUHVXUYLYRUVDQGGHFHGHQWVRI
a Peruvian helicopter crash brought a wrongful-death action seeking to re-
cover from the corporation as the owner of the helicopter involved in the 
accident.52 Using Perkins as a \DUGVWLFNWKH&RXUWFRQFOXGHGWKDW+HOLFRO¶V
FRQWDFWVZLWK7H[DVGLGQRWFRQVWLWXWHWKHW\SHRI³V\VWHPDWLFDQGFRQWLQu-
RXVFRQWDFWV´QHFHVVDU\WRH[HUFLVHJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQ53
7KH&RXUWHQXPHUDWHG+HOLFRO¶VFRQWDFWVDVWKHIROORZLQJGLVSDWFKLQJ
its CEO to Houston for a single contract-negotiation meeting; purchasing 
substantial amounts of equipment, helicopters, and training services from a 
Fort Worth-based company; depositing checks drawn on a Houston bank; 
and sending personnel to Fort Worth for training purposes.54 The Court dis-
PLVVHGWKH&(2¶VORQHWULSWR7H[DVDVLQVXIILFLHQWO\FRQWLQXRXVRUV\VWHm-
atic in nature.55 Similarly, the Court considered the checks drawn on the 
+RXVWRQEDQNRI ³QHJOLJLEOH VLJQLILFDQFH´ ILQGLQJ WKDW WKH ORFDWLRQRI WKH
bank is a matter left to the discretion of the payee, and Helicol had no con-
trol over the matter.56 7KH&RXUWUHDVRQHG³VXFKXQLODWHUDODFWLYLW\RIDQRWh-
er party or a third person is not an appropriate consideration when determin-
ing whether a defendant has sufficient contacts with a forum [s]tate to justi-
I\ DQ DVVHUWLRQ RI MXULVGLFWLRQ´57 7KH&RXUW DOVR GLVPLVVHG+HOLFRO¶V SXr-
chases within Texas despite the fact that it spent more than $4 million over a 
seven-year period, buying approximately eighty percent of its fleet within 
the forum.58 Although the purchases were substantial and regular, the Court 
UHOLHG RQ D SUHYLRXV FDVH WR FRQFOXGH WKDW ³SXUFKDVHV DQG UHODWHG WULSV
standLQJDORQHDUHQRWDVXIILFLHQWEDVLVIRUD>V@WDWH¶VDVVHUWLRQRIMXULVGLc-
WLRQ´59 SimLODUO\WKH&RXUWGHFLGHGWKDWWKHEULHISUHVHQFHRI+HOLFRO¶VHm-
ployees in Texas for training purposes did not sufficiently enhance the na-
51. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415 (1984).
52. Id. at 410. 
53. Id. at 416. 
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 417 (citing Kulko v. Cal. Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84 (1978)). 
58. Id. at 411, 417±18. 
59. Id. at 417 (citing Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1923)). 
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ture of its contacts so that the Texas courts could exercise general jurisdic-
tion.60
Taken together, Perkins and Helicopteros represent opposite points at 
the ends of the general jurisdiction spectrum. In Perkins, general jurisdiction 
comported with due-process principles because the Philippines-based com-
pany essentially had its principal place of business in Ohio during World 
War II.61 In contrast, Helicopteros established that mere sales within the 
forum state, although regular and substantial, are not enough to warrant gen-
eral jurisdiction.62 Between these two points, however, lower courts had 
little guidance in assessing the nature and quality of contacts that meet the 
³FRQWLQXRXVDQGV\VWHPDWLF´WKUHVKROGIRUJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQ
B.  Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 
(2011). 
In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the Court at-
tempted to close the general-jurisdiction gap posed by Perkins and 
Helicopteros. The case arose from a bus accident in France in which two 
thirteen-year-old boys from North Carolina were killed.63 7KHER\V¶SDUHQWV
brought an action for damages in a North Carolina state court against Good-
year USA and three of its subsidiaries, operating in Turkey, France, and 
Luxembourg, alleging that a defective tire manufactured in Turkey caused 
the deadly accident.64 Goodyear USA did not contest jurisdiction, as it con-
ceded that it maintained plants in the state and regularly conducted business 
there.65 The foreign subsidiaries, however, challenged the exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction by the trial court.66
The trial court, and then the North Carolina Court of Appeals, held that 
the contacts between the foreign subsidiaries and the forum state were suffi-
FLHQWO\³FRQWLQXRXVDQGV\VWHPDWLF´IRUWKHVWDWH¶VFRXUWVWRDVVHUWMXULVGLc-
tion.67 7KH IRUHLJQ VXEVLGLDULHV¶ FRQWDFWV FRQVLVWHG RI GLVWULEXWLQJ WHQV RI
thousands (out of tens of millions) of tires in North Carolina through other 
Goodyear USA affiliates.68 The North Carolina Court of Appeals reasoned 
WKDW WKH IRUHLJQ VXEVLGLDULHV WKURXJK*RRG\HDU¶V ³highly-organized distri-
bution process´ VXEPLWWHG WR WKH FRXUW¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ E\putting their tires 
60. Id. at 418. 
61. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 447±49 (1952). 
62. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 418. 
63. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2850 (2011). 
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2851±52. 
67. Id. at 2852. 
68. Id.
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into the stream of commerce without attempting to limit or confine sales 
within North Carolina.69 Furthermore, the court asserted that the state had a 
legitimate interest in providing a forum for the plaintiffs because traveling to 
France to litigate the action constituted a considerable hardship.70 The North 
Carolina Supreme Court declined discretionary review.71
In reversing, a unanimous Supreme Court offered a broad opinion in an 
attempt to reiterate the proper demarcation between specific and general 
jurisdiction, as well as to clarify the scope of general jurisdiction. Justice 
Ginsburg, writing for the Court, began by distinguishing between the two 
theories of personal jurisdiction, as articulated in International Shoe and 
then later refined by Helicopteros.72 She noted that the North Carolina courts 
KDG EOXUUHG WKH OLQH EHWZHHQ ³DOO SXUSRVH´ JHQHUDO MXULVGLFWLRQ DQG ³FDVH-
OLQNHG´ VSHFLILF MXULVGLFWLRQ73 She then emphasized that stream-of-
FRPPHUFH WKHRU\ RU WKH IORZ RI D PDQXIDFWXUHU¶V Sroducts into a forum 
VWDWHLVFRQILQHGWRVSHFLILFMXULVGLFWLRQDQGWKDW³WLHVVHUYLQJWREROVWHUWKH
exercise of specific jurisdiction do not warrant a determination that, based 
RQWKRVHWLHVWKHIRUXPKDVJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQRYHUDGHIHQGDQW´74 North 
Carolina lacked specific jurisdiction to adjudicate the claim because the ac-
cident occurred outside the forum and the allegedly defective tires had been 
manufactured and sold abroad.75
Likewise, the Court concluded that the state courts lacked authority to 
H[HUFLVHJHQHUDO MXULVGLFWLRQEDVHGRQ WKHVDOHVRI WKH IRUHLJQVXEVLGLDULHV¶
WLUHV ³VSRUDGLFDOO\PDGH LQ 1RUWK &DUROLQD WKURXJK LQWHUPHGLDULHV´76 The 
&RXUWOLNHQHGWKHVXEVLGLDULHV¶FRQWDFWVWRWKRVHLWGLVPLVVHGLQHelicopteros
and relied on the case further for the proposition that sales, even those oc-
curring at regular intervals, are not enough to support the exercise of general 
jurisdiction.77 As such, it concluded that the attenuated contacts between the 
IRUHLJQVXEVLGLDULHVDQGWKHIRUXPVWDWH³>IHOO@ IDUVKRUWRIWKHµWKHFRQWLQu-
RXVDQGV\VWHPDWLFJHQHUDOEXVLQHVVFRQWDFWV¶QHFHVVDU\WRHPSRZHU1RUWK
Carolina to entertain suit against them on claims unrelated to anything that 
FRQQHFWVWKHPWRWKH>V@WDWH´78 Furthermore, in a footnote, the Court rebut-
ted the fairness reasoning asserted by the North Carolina Court of Appeals, 
QRWLQJWKDWJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQLVQRWSUHPLVHGRQWKHSODLQWLII¶VLQWHUHVWVEXW
69. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2852±53 (citing Brown v. Meter, 681 S.E.2d 382, 394 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2009)). 
70. Id. at 2853 (citing Brown, 681 S.E.2d at 394). 
71. Id.
72. Id. at 2853±54. 
73. Id. at 2849. 
74. Id.
75. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851. 
76. Id. at 2856. 
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2857. 
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UDWKHUWKHSODLQWLII¶VUHVLGHQFHLQWKHIRUXPVWDWHLVJHUPDQHRQO\WRVSHFLILF
jurisdiction.79
In reversing, the Court articulated the proper test for analyzing when 
general jurisdiction may be warranted²when the contacts of a foreign cor-
SRUDWLRQDUH³VRµFRQWLQXRXVDQGV\VWHPDWLF¶DVWRUHQGHUWKHPHVVHQWLDOO\at 
home LQWKHIRUXPVWDWH´80 Justice Ginsburg did not expressly define when a 
FRUSRUDWLRQLVSURSHUO\FRQVLGHUHG³DWKRPH´IRUWKHSXUSRVHVRIVXEMHFWLQJ
it to adjudicatory authority. She did, however, note that Perkins ³UHPDLQV
[t]he textbook case of general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a 
IRUHLJQFRUSRUDWLRQWKDWKDVQRWFRQVHQWHGWRVXLWLQWKHIRUXP´81 In compar-
LVRQVKHDVVHUWHGWKDW³XQOLNHWKHGHIHQGDQWLQPerkins, whose sole wartime 
business activity was conducted in Ohio, petitioners are in no sense at home 
LQ1RUWK&DUROLQD´82
C.  Specific Jurisdiction Prior to Nicastro
As noted in Goodyear, specific jurisdiction encompasses the bulk of 
WKH&RXUW¶VSHUVRQDOMXULVGLFWLRQMXULVSUXGHQFH83 In contrast to general juris-
diction, specific jurisdiction is predicated on the underlying cODLPLWLV³GLs-
pute-specific, based only on affiliations between the forum and the contro-
YHUV\´84 Although the Court has attempted to refine the contours of specific 
jurisdiction numerous times, the application of the minimum-contacts test 
has caused significant confusion among lower courts, leading to varied re-
sults across jurisdictions, especially in the context of the stream-of-
commerce theory.85 Much of the confusion in this area stems from the divid-
ed opinion of the Court in Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of 
California, Solano County.86
79. Id. at 2857 n.5. 
80. Id. at 2851 (emphasis added) (citing Int¶l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 
317 (1945)). 
81. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (citing Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 
1032 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
82. Id. at 2857. 
83. Id. at 2854 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Cal. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); 
Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. 
Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)). 
84. See Twitchell, supra note 38. 
85. See Angela M. Laughlin, This Ain¶t the Texas Two Step Folks: Disharmony, Confu-
sion, and the Unfair Nature of Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in the Fifth Circuit, 37 CAP. U.
L. REV. 681, 703±04 (2009) (collecting cases demonstrating the split among circuit courts on 
the appropriate stream-of-commerce test).
86. 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
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1. Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano 
County, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
In Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, Solano 
County, the Court sought to clarify whether stream-of-commerce theory 
could support the exercise of personal jurisdiction when a product is sold 
indirectly in the forum state. The case arose out of a motorcycle accident, 
which caused significant injury to the driver and killed his wife, a passenger 
on the bike.87 The driver, Gary Zurcher, filed suit in California, alleging 
GHIHFWVLQWKHPRWRUF\FOH¶VWLUHWXEHDQGVHDODQWFDXVHGKLPWRORVHFRQWURO
of the vehicle.88 Among the defendants were Zurcher, the Taiwanese manu-
facturer of the tube, and Cheng 6KLQ5XEEHU ,QGXVWULDO&RPSDQ\ ³&KHQJ
6KLQ´89 In turn, Cheng Shin cross-complained seeking indemnification 
from its co-defendants, including Asahi Metal, the manufacturer of the 
WXEH¶V YDOYH90 Although Zurcher settled with the various defendants, the 
indemnity action against Asahi proceeded through the California courts.91
$VDKL¶VVDOHVWR&KHQJ6KLQRFFXUUHGDEURDGDQGFRQVLVWHGRIDWOHDVW
100,000 units annually over a five-year period.92 Cheng Shin acknowledged 
that California constituted approximately twenty percent of its sales in the 
United States.93 Because Asahi knew that the valves it placed into the stream 
of commerce through Cheng Shin would eventually find their way to Cali-
fornia, the California courts found that the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
comported with due process.94
In reversing, the Supreme Court unanimously agreed that the California 
courts lacked personal jurisdiction but disagreed on the proper stream-of-
commerce test.95 -XVWLFH2¶&RQQRUMRLQHGE\WKUHHRWKHUMXVWLFHVUHDVRQHG
thDW WKH'XH3URFHVV&ODXVHGHPDQGV³VRPHWKLQJPRUH´WKDQPHUHDZDUe-
ness that a product may reach the forum state through the stream of com-
merce.96 She reasoned that the minimum contacts needed to support the as-
sertion of jurisdiction must arise from the defeQGDQW¶VDFWVWKDWSXUSRVHIXOO\
target the forum state.97 7KH³VRPHWKLQJPRUH´QHHGHGWRHYLQFHSXUSRVHIXO
87. Id. at 105. 
88. Id. at 105±06. 
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 106. 
93. Id.
94. Id. at 110±11. 
95. Compare id. at 108±13 (O¶Conner, J., focusing on the ³substantial connection´ of 
minimum contacts´) with id. at 116±21 (Brennan, J., determining that defendant¶s actions, 
not its expectations, empower a state¶s courts to exercise jurisdiction.). 
96. Id. at 111. 
97. Id. at 112. 
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DYDLOPHQWPD\ LQFOXGH³GHVLJQLQJ WKHSURGXFW IRU WKHPDUNHW LQ WKH IRUXP
[s]tate, advertising in the forum [s]tate, establishing channels for providing 
regular advice to customers in the forum [s]tate, or marketing the product 
through a distributor who has agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum 
>V@WDWH´98
Justice Brennan, joined by three other justices, strenuously disagreed 
ZLWKWKLV³VWUHDP-of-commerce-SOXVWHVW´99 Justice Brennan argued that the 
Due Process Clause is satisfied when a manufacturer makes predictable 
sales through a distribution chain that sweeps its products into the forum 
state.100 +HDVVHUWHGWKDW³>D@VORQJDVDSDUWLFLSDQWLQ this process is aware 
that the final product is being marketed in the forum [s]tate, the possibility 
RIDODZVXLWWKHUHFDQQRWFRPHDVDVXUSULVH´101 Thus, Justice Brennan con-
FOXGHGWKDW$VDKL¶VV\VWHPDWLFDQGVXEVWDQWLDOVDOHVRIWKHYDOYHFRPSRQHQW
to Cheng Shin, coupled with its knowledge that Cheng Shin made regular 
sales of the final product in California, constituted sufficient minimum con-
tacts to support the exercise of specific jurisdiction.102
While the justices disagreed as to the appropriate stream-of-commerce 
test, they unanimously agreed that exercising personal jurisdiction over 
$VDKLGLGQRWFRPSRUWZLWK³WUDGLWLRQDOQRWLRQVRIIDLUSOD\DQGVXEVWDQWLDO
MXVWLFH´103 Assessing the reasonableness of exercising personal jurisdiction 
required evaluating the burden on the defendant, the interests of the forum 
VWDWH WKH SODLQWLII¶V LQWHUHVW LQ REWDLQLQJ UHOLHI WKH LQWHUVWDWH MXGLFLDO V\s-
WHP¶VLQWHUHVWLQREWDLQLQJWKHPRVWHIILFLHQWUHVROXWLRQRIFRQWURYHUVLHVDQG
WKH FROOHFWLYH VWDWHV¶ LQWHUHVWV LQ IXrthering substantive social policies.104
Applying these factors, the Court found that the burden on Asahi of defend-
ing in a foreign legal system far outweighed the interests of the forum state 
and the interests of the plaintiff, who had already obtained relief, leaving 
just the indemnity action, which stemmed from a transaction abroad.105
Moreover, the Court cautioned that the potential international ramifications 
of asserting personal jurisdiction militated against its exercise.106 Aside from 
the minimum-contacts question then, all nine justices agreed that it would be 
unreasonable and unfair for California to assert personal jurisdiction over 
Asahi.107
98. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. 
99. Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 121. 
103. Id. at 113 (citing Int¶l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). 
104. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113. 
105. Id. at 114. 
106. Id.
107. Id. at 114±16. 
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In the wake of Asahi, lower courts struggled with the appropriate 
stream-of-commerce test to adopt and apply.108 Some committed to Justice 
2¶&RQQRU¶VVWUHDP-of-commerce-plus test, while others adhered to the pure 
stream-of-commerce test as articulated by Justice Brennan.109 Adding to the 
MXPEOHDWOHDVWRQHFRXUWXWLOL]HGWKHIDFWRUVLQ-XVWLFH6WHYHQ¶VRSLQLRQWR
analyze the minimum-contacts question.110 Undoubtedly, this state of per-
petual confusion and inconsistency prompted the United States Supreme 
Court to reconsider and resolve the issue of when stream-of-commerce theo-
ry supports the exercise of personal jurisdiction. 
D. J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro111 presented the Court with the 
opportunity for resolution. The case involved a workplace accident in which 
Robert Nicastro lost four of his fingers when his hand became entangled in a 
metal-shearing machine.112 Although the accident occurred in New Jersey, 
Nicastro brought a products-OLDELOLW\DFWLRQDJDLQVWWKHPDFKLQH¶VPDQXIDc-
turer, J. McIntyre Machinery, which was incorporated in England.113 The 
New Jersey Supreme Court held that the state could exercise personal juris-
GLFWLRQRYHU-0F,QW\UH UHO\LQJ LQSDUWRQ-XVWLFH%UHQQDQ¶VSXUHVWUHDP-
of-commerce theory in Asahi.114 The court surmised that the company used 
an independent distributor in the United States to sell its machinery; its 
leadership attended annual scrap metal conventions to promote its product, 
although not in New Jersey; four machines ended up in New Jersey; it held 
patents on its recycling technology in the United States; and the distributor 
FRQGXFWHG LWV DGYHUWLVLQJ DQG VDOHV LQ DFFRUGZLWK -0F,QW\UH¶V GLUHFWLRQ
when possible.115 Because of these contacts, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
concluded that the manufacturer knew or should have reasonably known 
that its products, sold through a highly organized distribution system, would 
reach the forum state, and, therefore, the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
did not offend due process.116
108. Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and McIn-
tyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202, 210 (2011). 
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
112. Id. at 2786 (plurality opinion). 
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2785 (citing Nicastro v. McIntyre Mach. Am., Ltd., 987 A.2d 575, 591±92 
(N.J. 2010)). 
115. Id. at 2786. 
116. Id.
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A majority of the United States Supreme Court disagreed but also disa-
greed as to why.117 Ironically, Justice Kennedy, writing for a plurality, began 
E\DFNQRZOHGJLQJWKDW³>WKH@&RXUW¶VAsahi decision may be responsible in 
SDUW IRU >WKH 1HZ -HUVH\ 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V@ HUURU UHJDUGLQJ WKH VWUHDP RI
FRPPHUFH´DQGWKDWNicastro SUHVHQWHG³DQRSSRUWXQLW\WRSURYLGH greater 
FODULW\´118 +H WKHQ SURFHHGHG WR RXWULJKW UHMHFW -XVWLFH%UHQQDQ¶V FRQFXr-
rence in Asahi, as it made foreseeability, without more, the touchstone of 
personal jurisdiction.119 -XVWLFH.HQQHG\UHDVRQHG³WKDWLWLVWKHGHIHQGDQW¶V
actions, not his expectDWLRQVWKDWHPSRZHUD>V@WDWH¶VFRXUWVWRVXEMHFWKLP
WRMXGJPHQW´120 For the plurality, purposeful availment most closely resem-
EOHG -XVWLFH 2¶&RQQRU¶V VWUHDP-of-commerce-plus test in Asahi.121 Justice 
Kennedy concluded that courts may properly assert personal jurisdiction 
EDVHG RQ D FRUSRUDWLRQ¶V VDOH RI JRRGV ³RQO\ZKHUH WKH GHIHQGDQW FDQ EH
VDLGWRKDYHWDUJHWHGWKHIRUXP´122 Pursuant to this reasoning, Justice Ken-
nedy had little difficulty holding that J. McIntyre had not purposefully tar-
geted New Jersey.123 Instead, he asserted that the facts demonstrated a gen-
eral intent to serve the U.S. market but not the New Jersey market in par-
ticular.124 Absent activities specifically targeting the forum state, Justice 
Kennedy concluded that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over J. McIn-
tyre violated due process.125
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, concurred in the judgment but 
UHMHFWHG WKHSOXUDOLW\¶V ³VWULFW QR-MXULVGLFWLRQ UXOH´126 He reasoned that the 
case did not necessitate fashioning a new approach and expressed concern 
WKDW WKHSOXUDOLW\¶V UXOHPD\XOWLPDWHO\SURYHXQZRUNDEOHLQWKHFRQWH[WRI
modern, Internet-based commerce.127 Instead, Justice Breyer would have 
UHYHUVHGWKH1HZ-HUVH\6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VGHFLVLRQEDVHGRQH[LVWLQJSUHFe-
dent exclusively.128 He reasoned that the facts did not establish a regular 
flow of sales or goods into the forum state, a necessary finding under a pure 
stream-of-commerce analysis.129 Similarly, the record revealed no additional 
activity, such as advertising, special design features, or advice to consumers 
117. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2785±91 (plurality opinion); Id. at 2791±94 (Breyer, J., con-
curring in the judgment). 
118. Id. at 2786 (plurality opinion). 
119. Id. at 2788±89. 
120. Id. at 2789. 
121. Id. at 2788. 
122. Id.
123. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790. 
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2791. 
126. Id. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
127. Id. at 2792±93. 
128. Id.
129. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2792±93. 
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ZLWKLQ1HZ -HUVH\ WKXV KH GHHPHG DEVHQW WKH ³VRPHWKLQJPRUH´ QHHGHG
under the stream-of-commerce-plus test.130 Because Nicastro failed to show 
that J. McIntyre made a specific effort to sell in New Jersey, or that it put its 
goods into the stream of commerce expecting them to be purchased by New 
Jersey consumers, Justice Breyer found the exercise of jurisdiction improp-
er.131
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissent, strongly disagreed with the 
six justices who concluded that New Jersey improperly exercised personal 
jurisdiction.132 6KH DGPRQLVKHG WKHP IRU ³WXUQ>LQJ@ WKH FORFN EDFN WR WKH
days before modern long-arm statutes when a manufacturer, to avoid being 
haled into court where a user is injured, need only Pilate-like wash its hands 
RIDSURGXFWE\KDYLQJLQGHSHQGHQWGLVWULEXWRUVPDUNHWLW´133 According to 
KHUDVVHVVPHQWRI-0F,QW\UH8.¶VDFWLYLWLHVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHVLQFOXGLQJ
its purposeful engagement of the American distributor, Justice Ginsburg 
would have upheld the New JersH\6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VDVVHUWLRQRIMXULVGLFWLRQ
EDVHGRQWKHFRUSRUDWLRQ¶VWDUJHWHGHIIRUWVDW WKH8QLWHG6WDWHVPDUNHWDVD
whole.134 6KHUHDVRQHGWKDW³WKHPDFKLQHDUULYHG LQ1LFDVWUR¶V1HZ-HUVH\
workplace not randomly or fortuitously, but as a result of the U.S. connec-
tions and distribution system that [J.] McIntyre UK deliberately ar-
UDQJHG´135
)XUWKHUPRUH-XVWLFH*LQVEXUJ¶VGLVVHQWHPSKDVL]HG WKH IDLUQHVVSULn-
ciples inherent to the due process analysis.136 She noted that the distribution 
scheme and practices employed by J. McIntyre are typical of modern com-
merce, in which a foreign manufacturer solicits a U.S.-based entity to adver-
tise and sell its products anywhere customers can be found, rather than in a 
specific state.137 When that product is subsequently sold and delivered into 
the forum state where it injures an individual, she posited that, based on the 
mode of trade employed, it would be both fair and reasonable to require the 
foreign manufacturer to defend its product where the injury occurred.138 Alt-
hough adamantly opposed to a jurisdictional rule whereby an international 
seller could avoid jurisdiction simply by engaging an independent American 
distributor, Justice Ginsburg seemingly found solace in the fractured reason-
LQJRIKHUIHOORZMXVWLFHV³:KLOH,GLVVHQWIURPWKH&RXUW¶VMXGJPHQW,WDNH
130. Id. at 2792. 
131. Id.
132. Id. at 2794±95 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
133. Id. at 2795 (citing Russell Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Laby-
rinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531 (1995)). 
134. Id.
135. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2797 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
136. Id. at 2800. 
137. Id. at 2799. 
138. Id. at 2800. 
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heart that the plurality opinion does not speak for the Court, for that opinion 
ZRXOGWDNHDJLDQWVWHSDZD\IURPWKHµQRWLRQVRIIDLUSOD\DQGVXEVWDQWLDO
MXVWLFH¶XQGHUO\LQJInternational Shoe´139
III. ARGUMENT
Against this backdrop, courts and practitioners in Arkansas and the 
Eighth Circuit alike are attempting to discern the impact, if any, Goodyear 
and Nicastro have on existing precedent. To date, the Supreme Court of 
Arkansas and the Eighth Circuit have had a single opportunity in which to 
assess the meaning and impact of Goodyear on their respective general-
jurisdiction jurisprudence.140 7KLV VHFWLRQQRWHV WKDW WKH ³DW-KRPH´ WHVW KDV
WKXVIDUIDFWRUHGOLWWOHLQWRWKHFRXUWV¶ analyses; instead, general jurisdiction 
in Arkansas and the Eighth Circuit remains a fact-intensive inquiry, with 
FRXUWVZHLJKLQJ WKHQXPEHU DQGQDWXUHRI DGHIHQGDQW¶V FRQWDFWV WRGHWHr-
PLQHZKHWKHUWKH\DUHVXIILFLHQWO\³FRQWLQXRXVDQGV\VWHPDWLF´7ZRFases 
recently considered by the Supreme Court of Arkansas and the Eighth Cir-
cuit have honed in on the overall import of Goodyear²that courts should 
reserve general jurisdiction for exceptional circumstances²without attrib-
uting much significance to whether D IRUHLJQ GHIHQGDQW LV ³DW KRPH´141
Goodyear, therefore, has done little to affect the way in which practitioners 
should approach general jurisdiction or the way courts analyze it. 
On the other hand, Nicastro has the potential to completely overhaul 
existing precedent in the Eighth Circuit. While Arkansas is devoid of 
stream-of-commerce case law, Eighth Circuit precedent stands in direct con-
trast to the Nicastro plurality: the Eighth Circuit subjects foreign manufac-
turers142 at the head of domestic distribution systems to personal jurisdiction 
when they target markets as a whole, as opposed to a specific state. Despite 
this conflict, however, this note concludes that the Eighth Circuit need not²
and should not²depart from precedent. First, the Nicastro plurality¶VRSLn-
ion is not binding precedent. Indeed, in those jurisdictions that have consid-
ered NicastroDQHPHUJLQJPDMRULW\KDVOLPLWHGWKHFDVH¶VSUHFHGHQWLDOYDl-
ue and continues to adhere to their pre-Nicastro approaches.143 Second, and 
more significantly, the (LJKWK&LUFXLW¶VFXUUHQWSUHFHGHQWEHWWHUUHIOHFWVWKH
139. Id. at 2804. 
140. Viasystems, Inc. v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Co., 646 F.3d 589 (8th Cir. 
2011); Yanmar Co. v. Slater, 2012 Ark. 36, 386 S.W.3d 439. 
141. See infra Part III.A±B. 
142. This note focuses on end-product manufacturers, as opposed to component-part 
manufacturers. See generally Henry S. Noyes, The Persistent Problem of Purposeful 
Availment, 45 CONN. L. REV. 41 (2012) (describing the difference between end-product man-
ufacturers and component-part manufacturers). 
143. See infra Part III.D. 
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realities of modern global commerce, in which foreign manufacturers rely 
on domestic distributors to sell their merchandise to as many consumers as 
possible without regard to state borders. Thus, a framework that relies on 
specific state targeting, such as the Nicastro SOXUDOLW\¶V LVRXWPRGHGLQWo-
GD\¶V FRPPHUFLDOZRUOG )LQDOO\ WKLV QRWH FRQFOXGHV WKDW WKH (LJKWK&Lr-
FXLW¶VFXUUHQWDSSURDFKLVWKHEHWWHUDSSURDFKEDVHGRQWKHSROLF\FRQVLGHUa-
tions underlying personal jurisdiction jurisprudence²purposeful availment, 
fairness, and reciprocity. 
A.  7KH6XSUHPH&RXUWRI$UNDQVDV¶V*HQHUDO-Jurisdiction Analysis Be-
fore and After Goodyear
The power of the Arkansas courts to exert personal jurisdiction over 
non-resident defendants expanded significantly with the passage of Act 486 
of 1995.144 $FWRYHUKDXOHGWKHVWDWH¶VORQJ-arm statute, which previous-
ly confined personal jurisdiction to specific cases, such as those in which the 
cause of action arose from thH GHIHQGDQW¶V FRQWDFWV ZLWK WKH VWDWH WKRVH
where the defendant contracted for goods or services in the state, and those 
in which the defendant committed a tort in the state.145 Act 486 removed 
these categorical limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction, effectively 
³FRQYHUW>LQJ@$UNDQVDVLQWRDJHQHUDO-jurisdiction state for purposes of per-
VRQDO MXULVGLFWLRQ´146 Now, the long arm statute broadly provides that Ar-
NDQVDVFRXUWVKDYHSHUVRQDO MXULVGLFWLRQRYHUSDUWLHV³WR WKHPD[LPXPHx-
tent permitted by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
PHQWRI WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV&RQVWLWXWLRQ´147 Thus, by removing the require-
PHQW WKDW WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V FDXVH RI DFWLRQ DULVH IURP LWV FRQWDFWVZLWK WKH
state, Arkansas now exercises general jurisdiction to the extent authorized 
by the Due Process Clause.148
Since the passage of Act 486, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has spar-
ingly considered the due process limits of general jurisdiction.149 In those 
cases, it has employed a fact-intensive inquiry, weighing the quantity and 
TXDOLW\RI WKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFRQWDFWV DJDLQVW WKH ³SUHFLRXV OLWWOH DXWKRULW\´150
144. Act of Feb. 28, 1995, No. 486, 1995 Ark. Acts 486 (codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 
16-4-101(Repl. 2010)). 
145. Davis v. St. John¶s Health Sys., Inc., 348 Ark. 17, 22±23, 71 S.W.3d 55, 57±58
(2002). 
146. Id. at 25, 71 S.W.3d at 59. 
147. ARK. CODE ANN. §16-4-101(B) (Repl. 2010). 
148. Davis, 348 Ark. at 25, 71 S.W.3d at 59. 
149. See Ganey v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A., 366 Ark. 238, 247±49, 234 S.W.3d 
838, 844±45 (2006); Volunteer Transp., Inc. v. House, 357 Ark. 95, 100±02, 162 S.W.3d 
456, 458±60 (2004); Davis, 348 Ark. at 25±27, 71 S.W.3d at 59±61; John Norrell Arms, Inc. 
v. Higgins, 332 Ark. 24, 962 S.W.2d 801 (1998). 
150. Davis, 348 Ark. at 25, 71 S.W.3d at 59. 
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provided by the Supreme Court of the United States. As a result, the court 
has regularly declined to confer general jurisdiction based on insufficient 
contacts.151 Where it has found general jurisdiction proper, the defendant
had a substantial presence in the state, including having an agent for service 
of process, employees, and property in Arkansas, as well as being qualified 
to do business in the state and conducting business in the state through 
wholly-owned subsidiaries.152
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has decided one case based on general 
jurisdiction post-Goodyear. In Yanmar Company v. Slater,153 the plaintiff 
asserted various tort claims against the Japanese manufacturer of a tractor 
that killed her husband, Rudy Slater.154 In a matter of first impression, the 
FRXUWKHOGWKDW$UNDQVDV¶VH[HUFLVHRIJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQYLRODWHGGXHSUo-
cess, applying Goodyear but relying primarily on the fact-intensive contacts 
inquiry to reach its result.155
Yanmar manufactured the tractor at issue in 1977 and sold it to an au-
thorized Yanmar distributor in Japan.156 ,Q  ZLWKRXW <DQPDU¶V
knowledge, a Vietnamese company acquired the tractor, and it subsequently 
found its way into the United StaWHVWKURXJKWKH³JUD\PDUNHW´157 in 2004.158
First acquired by a Texas company, the tractor was then auctioned in Okla-
homa to the dealer that ultimately sold it to Rudy Slater, more than twenty-
six years after its manufacture date.159 Just days after the purchase, the trac-
tor rolled over on Mr. Slater as he mowed the grass and killed him.160
0U6ODWHU¶VZLGRZ:DQGD6ODWHUDORQJZLWKWKHFRXSOH¶VVRQILOHGD
wrongful-death action premised on various claims against Yanmar Japan, 
and the companies in the long acquisition chain, as well as Yanmar Ameri-
ca, a subsidiary of Yanmar Japan that sells parts for authorized Yanmar trac-
tors in the United States.161 After a trial on the negligence claims, a jury sit-
ting in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County returned a verdict of $2.5 mil-
151. See, e.g., Ganey, 366 Ark. at 247±48, 234 S.W.3d at 844±45; John Norell Arms, 332 
Ark. at 29, 962 S.W.2d at 804. 
152. Davis, 348 Ark. at 26±27, 71 S.W.3d at 60±61. 
153. 2012 Ark. 36, 386 S.W.3d 439. 
154. Id. at 3, 386 S.W.3d at 442. 
155. Id. at 4±12, 386 S.W.3d at 443±47. 
156. Id. at 2, 386 S.W.3d at 442. 
157. The gray market is defined as ³a market in which the seller uses legal but sometimes 
unethical methods to avoid a manufacturer¶s distribution chain and thereby sell goods (espe-
cially imported goods) at prices lower than those envisioned by the manufacturer.´ BLACK¶S
LAW DICTIONARY 1220 (9th ed. 2009). 
158. Yanmar, 2012 Ark. at 2, 386 S.W.3d at 442. 
159. Id.
160. Id. at 3, 386 S.W.3d at 442. 
161. Id. at 3±7, 386 S.W.3d at 444±45. 
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lion against the defendants.162 The appeal, premised largely on Yanmar Ja-
SDQ¶V DUJXPHQW WKDW WKH FLUFXLW FRXUW ODFNHG MXULVGLFWLRQ UHDFKHG WKH 6u-
preme Court of Arkansas on certification.163
The Supreme Court of Arkansas began its analysis by reciting the ap-
plicable rule from Helicopteros³DGHIHQGDQWPD\EHVXEMHFW WR WKHIRUXP
VWDWH¶VH[HUFLVHRISHUVRQDOMXULVGLFWLRQLIJHQHUDOO\LWVFRQWDFWVZLWKWKHVWDWH
DUH FRQWLQXRXV V\VWHPDWLF DQG VXEVWDQWLDO´164 Against this high bar, the 
court determineGWKDW<DQPDU-DSDQ¶VFRQWDFWVZLWK$UNDQVDVIHOOVKRUW ,W
noted that Yanmar Japan lacked authorization to conduct business in the 
state and did not maintain an agent for service of process in the state.165 Fur-
ther, it did not have property, offices, employees, assets, or accounts in Ar-
kansas.166 And, while Yanmar Japan previously sold its tractors in the Unit-
ed States, such sales ceased in 1991.167 It did, however, continue to sell parts 
in Arkansas, accumulating average annual sales of $10,000, and retained 
authorized dealers in the state in addition to its Illinois-based subsidiary, 
Yanmar America.168
0UV6ODWHUUHOLHGRQ<DQPDU-DSDQ¶VSDVWVDOHVDQGLWVFXUUHQWUHODWLRn-
ship with the subsidiary as sufficient to warrant the exercise of personal ju-
risdiction.169 For support, she pointed to a Supreme Court of Alabama deci-
sion reversing summary judgment for Yanmar in a similar suit over a gray-
market tractor.170 In Smith v. Yanmar Diesel Engine Co.,171 the court noted 
WKDW <DQPDU¶V VWLSXODWLRQ WKDW LW VHOOV SDUWV WKURXgh its distributor in Ala-
bama made summary judgment inappropriate, as the pervasiveness of those 
sales may have been enough to confer general jurisdiction.172 The Supreme 
Court of Arkansas refused to follow this line of reasoning based on the 
unique procedural posture of the Alabama case.173 Moreover, the court be-
lieved that Smith conflicted with the reasoning of Goodyear.174 After sum-
PDUL]LQJWKHFDVHEXWZLWKRXWUHFLWDWLRQRUFLWDWLRQWRWKH³DWKRPH´VWDQd-
DUG WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW RI $UNDQVDV FRQFOXGHG WKDW ³>L@W is simply not 
162. Id. at 3±4, 386 S.W.3d at 442±43. 
163. Id. at 4, 386 S.W.3d at 443. 
164. Yanmar, 2012 Ark. at 7, 386 S.W.3d at 444 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Co-
lombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415±16 (1984)). 
165. Id. at 8, 386 S.W.3d at 445. 
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 7±8, 386 S.W.3d at 445. 
169. Id. at 8±9, 386 S.W.3d at 445. 
170. Yanmar, 2012 Ark. at 9, 386 S.W.3d at 445±46 (citing Smith v. Yanmar Diesel 
Engine Co., 855 So.2d 1039, 1043 (Ala. 2003)). 
171. 855 So.2d 1039 (Ala. 2003). 
172. Id. at 1043. 
173. Yanmar, 2012 Ark. at 9, 386 S.W.3d at 445±46. 
174. Id. at 10±11, 386 S.W.3d at 446±47. 
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enough that Yanmar Japan used to sell tractors in Arkansas or that it has a 
VXEVLGLDU\ WKDW GLVWULEXWHV SDUWV LQ WKLV VWDWH´175 The court further admon-
LVKHGWKHFLUFXLWFRXUWIRUHQJDJLQJLQWKH³VSUDZOLQJYLHZRIJHQHUDOMXULs-
GLFWLRQ´UHMHFWed by the nine justices in Goodyear.176
)URPWKHIRUHJRLQJ LW LVFOHDUWKDWWKH³DW-KRPH´VWDQGDUGHQXQFLDWHG
in Goodyear has had limited impact on general jurisdiction in Arkansas. In 
Yanmar, the court employed a factual inquiry consistent with its previous 
general jurisdiction cases and determined that Yanmar Japan had insuffi-
cient contacts with Arkansas. Taking Goodyear out of the equation, the 
FRXUW¶VDVVHVVPHQWRI<DQPDU-DSDQ¶VFRQWDFWVLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKLWVSUHFe-
dent, in which it has only conferred general jurisdiction based on a substan-
tial number of significant contacts with the state.177 Further, when compared 
to the contacts considered in Helicopteros²more than $4 million in sales 
over a seven-year period, training, and visits to the forum state²the quality 
DQG TXDQWLW\ RI <DQPDU¶V FRQWDFWV Iell short of those rejected by the 
Court.178
The Yanmar DQDO\VLVLVLQGLFDWLYHRIWKH³DW-KRPH´WHVW¶VOLPLWHGXWLOi-
ty²QDPHO\ZKDWGRHV LWPHDQ WREH ³DWKRPH"´7KHGLIIHULQJ LQWHUSUHWa-
tions offered by commentatorV DUH HYLGHQFH RI WKH VWDQGDUG¶V DPRUSKRXV
nature.179 One interpretation is that the standard negates numerous lower 
FRXUWV¶ILQGLQJVWKDWDFRUSRUDWLRQLVVXEMHFWWRJHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQZKHUHYHU
LWLV³GRLQJEXVLQHVV´180 Another plausible reading is that a substantial vol-
ume of sales into the forum state survives Goodyear as a basis for general 
jurisdiction but that a stream-of-commerce theory does not, as sporadic and 
175. Id. at 11, 386 S.W.3d at 446. 
176. Id. at 10, 386 S.W.3d at 446±47 (citing Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856 (2011)). 
177. See Davis v. St. John¶s Health Sys., Inc., 348 Ark. 17, 26±27, 71 S.W.3d 55, 60±61 
(2002). 
178. See supra Part II.A.2. 
179. See, e.g., Meir Feder, Goodyear, ³Home´, and the Uncertain Future of Doing Busi-
ness Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 679, 692-95 (2012) (arguing that Goodyear narrowed 
the scope of general jurisdiction such that it cannot be based on whether the defendant is 
doing business in the forum state and suggesting that ³at home´ may be limited to one loca-
tion); James R. Pielemeier, Goodyear Dunlop: A Welcome Refinement of the Language of 
General Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 969, 990±91 (2012) (arguing that 
Goodyear invalidated general jurisdiction based on sales in the forum, and the ³at home´
standard for general jurisdiction will entail more substantial contacts with the forum than 
those considered sufficient under previous tests); Charles W. ³Rocky´ Rhodes, Nineteenth 
Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV.
387, 429 (2012) (asserting that a non-resident corporation may be considered ³at home´ when 
it ³performs its core supervisory functions in the state in comparable quantities to a domicili-
ary´); Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of ³Essentially at Home´ in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L.
REV. 527, 545±48 (2012) (suggesting five factors that courts should consider in determining 
whether a non-resident corporation is ³at home´ in the forum state). 
180. See Feder, supra note 179. 
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LQGLUHFW VDOHV FDQQRW UHQGHU D FRUSRUDWLRQ ³DW KRPH´181 And, yet another 
interpretation may EHWKDW³DWKRPH´QHFHVVLWDWHVDQLQTXLU\LQWRZKHWKHUWKH
non-resident defendant views itself, and is viewed by others, as a member of 
the community, giving significant weight to a physical presence in the fo-
rum state.182
Most commentators agree that at the very least, the Goodyear opinion 
served to narrow the scope of general jurisdiction. In that vein, perhaps the 
PRVW SUDFWLFDO LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI ³DW KRPH´ LV WKDW LW LVPHUHO\ D UHVWULFWLYH
clause employed to aid lower courts in their analysis and to encourage them 
to limit general jurisdiction to exceptional cases.183 This interpretation com-
SRUWVZLWK-XVWLFH*LQVEXUJ¶VUHIHUHQFHWRPerkins DVWKH³WH[WERRNFDVH´RI
general jurisdiction.184 Short of facts that evidence an entity principally op-
erates in or is LQFRUSRUDWHGZLWKLQ WKH IRUXPVWDWH WKH³DWKRPH´VWDQGDUG
necessitates sufficiently numerous, substantial, and regular contacts by a 
corporation in order to appropriately find a basis for general jurisdiction. In 
this regard, the test may simply be an afILUPDWLRQ RI WKH ³FRQWLQXRXV DQG
V\VWHPDWLFFRQWDFWV´DQDO\VLVDOUHDG\HPSOR\HGE\ORZHUFRXUWV185
:KLOH³DWKRPH´LVRSHQWRLQWHUSUHWDWLRQWKHYanmar decision demon-
strates that deciphering its precise meaning is unnecessary. Instead, the Su-
preme Court of Arkansas can and did rely on Goodyear for its overall im-
port²that the scope of general jurisdiction is narrow. This is evident by the 
FRXUW¶VUHOLDQFHRQWKHODQJXDJHRIGoodyear FDXWLRQLQJDJDLQVWD³VSUDZl-
LQJ YLHZ RI JHQHUDO MXULVGLFWLRQ´186 but not otherwise analyzing whether 
<DQPDU -DSDQ FRXOG EH FRQVLGHUHG DW KRPH LQ $UNDQVDV :KLOH WKH ³DW
KRPH´ WHVWPD\FRPH WRKDYHPRUHVLJQLILFDQFH LQDFORVHUFDVHEDVHGRQ
different facts,187 for now, the Arkansas high court seems to have confined 
Goodyear to the broad proposition that general jurisdiction is to be narrowly 
construed. As such, the court is likely to continue its fact-intensive analysis 
RIDGHIHQGDQW¶VFRQWDFWVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKLWVH[LVWLQJSUHFHGHQW
181. See Peterson, supra note 108, at 216±17. 
182. See Stein, supra note 179, at 543. 
183. See Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 595 (2012) (asserting that the ³at 
home´ metaphor is meant to supplement, rather than replace, the old metaphors ³of substan-
tial activity or continuous and systematic contacts´). 
184. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2856 (2011) 
(citing Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1981)). 
185. 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE., FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1067.5 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2013). 
186. Yanmar Co. v. Slater, 2012 Ark. 36, at 11, 386 S.W.3d 439, 447 (citing Goodyear,
131 S. Ct. at 2856). 
187. See Hoffheimer, supra note 183, at 604 (noting that a hard case may be found where 
the defendant has a physical office in the forum state but does not do most of its business 
within that jurisdiction). 
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B.  7KH(LJKWK&LUFXLW¶V*HQHUDO-XULVGLFWLRQ$Qalysis Before and After 
Goodyear
Like the Supreme Court of Arkansas, the Eighth Circuit employs a 
fact-LQWHQVLYHLQTXLU\WRGHWHUPLQHZKHWKHUWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFRQWDFWVZLWKWKH
IRUXPVWDWHDUH³VRFRQWLQXRXVDQGV\VWHPLF´VRDVWRFRQIHUJHQHUDOMXULs-
diction.188 In the majority of cases in which the court has expressly analyzed 
JHQHUDOMXULVGLFWLRQLWKDVIRXQGWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VFRQWDFWV LQVXIILFLHQW189 In 
the few instances in which general jurisdiction has been found, the defend-
ant had a physical location, employees, and had designated an agent for ser-
vice of process in the forum.190
Given that the Eighth Circuit already narrowly construes the scope of 
general jurisdiction, Goodyear did little to change its analysis to date. Since 
Goodyear, the court has had one opportunity in which to apply and interpret 
Goodyear. In Viasystems v. EBM-Papst St. Georgen GmbH & Company, 191
Missouri-based Viasystems sued a German manufacturer of cooling fans, St. 
Georgen, alleging several tort and contract claims based on apparent defects 
in the fans.192 The district court dismissed the suit, finding that it lacked spe-
cific and general jurisdiction over St. Georgen, and Viasystems appealed.193
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, concluding that neither specific nor gen-
eral jurisdiction supported an assertion of adjudicatory authority over St. 
Georgen.194 7KHFRXUW UHMHFWHG9LDV\VWHPV¶VDUJXPHQW WKDWWKHDFWLYLWLHVRI
6W*HRUJHQ¶VGLVWULEXWRUHEP-SDSVW³(3,´ZLWKLQWKHIRUXPVWDWHRI0Ls-
souri, subjected it to general jurisdiction.195 The court recited the test for 
general jurisdiction directly from Goodyear, noting that the defendant must 
have such continuous and systematic contacts with the forum state so as to 
188. See, e.g., Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 795 (8th Cir. 2010). 
189. See Wells Dairy, Inc. v. Food Movers Int¶l, Inc., 607 F.3d 515, 519 (8th Cir. 2010); 
Arden, 614 F.3d at 795; Johnson v. Woodcock, 444 F.3d 953, 956±57 (8th Cir. 2006); Epps 
v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 650 (8th Cir. 2003); Guinness Imp. Co. v. Mark 
VII Distribs. Inc., 153 F.3d 607, 614±15 (8th Cir. 1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Maples 
Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 1100, 1103 (8th Cir. 1996); H & W Wire Corp. v. Lone Star Wire, Inc., 
34 F.3d 1070, at*2 (8th Cir. 1994); Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 819 
(8th Cir. 1994). 
190. Dever v. Hentzen Coatings, Inc., 380 F.3d 1070, 1075 (8th Cir. 2004) (finding that 
the Arkansas courts have general jurisdiction over Ohio-based Sherwin Williams because it 
³conducts continuous business in Arkansas; it employs workers, owns and leases property, 
and has designated an agent for service of process in the state.´). 
191. 646 F.3d 589 (8th Cir. 2011). 
192. Id. at 591±92. 
193. Id. at 591±92. 
194. Id. at 595, 598. 
195. Id. at 595±98. 
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PDNHLW³DWKRPH´WKHUH196 The court pointed to both Goodyear and Perkins
for the proposLWLRQWKDW³WKHSDUDGLJPIRUXPIRUWKHH[HUFLVHRIJHQHUDOMu-
ULVGLFWLRQ>RYHUDQLQGLYLGXDO@LVWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VGRPLFLOHIRUDFRUSRUDWLRQ
it is an equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at 
KRPH´197
The court reasoned that SW*HRUJHQ¶VSRVLWLRQDVKHDGRIDGLVWULEXWLRQ
network that benefitted from the sales of its distributor in the forum state 
could not confer general jurisdiction.198 While the court had recognized a 
variant of stream-of-commerce theory, supporting jurisdiction over a foreign 
manufacturer that pushes its products into a multi-state area through a dis-
tributor,199 it noted that precedent within the circuit limited such stream-of-
commerce inquiries to specific jurisdiction.200 As further support, the court 
cited Goodyear, noting that the Supreme Court had similarly dismissed 
VWUHDPRI FRPPHUFH DV ³[a] connection so limited between the forum and 
the foreign corporation [that it] is an inadequate basis for the exercise of 
JHQHUDO MXULVGLFWLRQ´201 Finally, the court noted that the nine justices in 
Goodyear KDGH[SUHVVO\GLVDYRZHGD ³VSUDZOLQJYLHZRIJHQHUDO MXULVGLc-
WLRQ´WKDWZRXOGPDNHDQ\PDQXIDFWXUHUDPHQDEOHWRVXLWZKHUHYHULWVSURd-
ucts are distributed.202
196. Id. at 595 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 
2846, 2851 (2011)). 
197. Viasystems, 646 F.3d at 595 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853±54 and citing 
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 444±45 (1952)). 
198. Id. at 597±98. Viasystems also argued that St. Georgen and EPI maintained either an 
express or implied agency relationship, such that the in-state distributor EPI¶s actions could 
be imputed to the principal St. Georgen, thereby conferring personal jurisdiction. Id. at 595±
96. The court rejected this argument on the facts, noting that EPI¶s scattered marketing state-
ments on its website could not establish an express agency relationship simply because St. 
Georgen owned and operated the website. Id. at 596. In addition, Viasystems also failed to 
meet the standard for an implied agency relationship²namely that St. Georgen ³so con-
trolled and dominated the affairs of the subsidiary that the latter¶s corporate existence was 
disregarded so as to cause the residential corporation to act as the nonresidential corporate 
defendant¶s alter ego.´ Id. (quoting Epps v. Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 327 F.3d 642, 649 
(8th Cir. 2003) and citing Lakota Girl Scout Council, Inc. v. Havey Fund-Raising Mgmt., 
Inc., 519 F.2d 634, 637 (8th Cir. 1975)). Essentially, Viasystems argued for general jurisdic-
tion based on piercing the corporate veil of St. Georgen but failed to do so because it could 
not establish the high degree of control and domination of the parent over its subsidiary. Id. at 
596±97. ³St. Georgen did not create EPI, has no control or authority over EPI, and has no 
directors or officers in common with EPI. The relationship between these two companies is 
too attenuated to support the assertion of personal jurisdiction over St. Georgen based on the 
activities of EPI.´ Id. at 597. 
199. Id. (citing Vandelune v. 4B Elevator Components Unlimited, 148 F.3d 943, 948 (8th 
Cir. 1998)). 
200. Id. (citing Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851). 
201. Id. (citing Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856). 
202. Id.
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From the foregoing, Goodyear merely serves as an affirmation of the 
FRXUW¶V JHQHUDO-jurisdiction jurisprudence²namely, that it is reserved for 
H[FHSWLRQDOFDVHV:KLOHWKH(LJKWK&LUFXLWGXWLIXOO\FLWHGWKH³DWKRPH´WHVW
from GoodyearLWGLGQRWSURPLQHQWO\IDFWRULQWKHFRXUW¶VDQDO\VLVRIJHn-
eral jurisdiction, as LWQHYHUGLVFXVVHGWKHWHVW¶VPHDQLQJQRUGLGLWDQDO\]H
WKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVXQGHUZKLFK6W*HRUJHQPLJKWEHFRQVLGHUHG³DWKRPH´
LQ 0LVVRXUL ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH FRXUW GLVPLVVHG 9LDV\VWHPV¶ SULQFLSDO DUJu-
ment²WKDW6W*HRUJHQ¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWK(3,VXEMHFWHd it to general juris-
diction²largely based on existing circuit precedent confining stream-of-
commerce theories to specific jurisdiction, which it deemed lacking in the 
case. The court pointed to Goodyear merely as an affirmation of those prior 
holdings in which it correctly distinguished between the two doctrines. 
Similar to YanmarWKHFLUFXLWFRXUW¶VIDLOXUHWRPHDQLQJIXOO\LQWHUSUHW
DQGDSSO\³DWKRPH´LVLQSDUWDWWULEXWDEOHWRWKHWHVW¶VDPELJXLW\EXWDOVRD
UHIOHFWLRQ WKDW WKH FRXUW¶V H[LVWLQJ SUHFHGHnt narrowly construes general 
jurisdiction. Viasystems presented scant evidence, never PLQG ³VXEVWDQWLDO
DQG FRQWLQXRXV´ HYLGHQFH RI 6W *HRUJHQ¶V WLHV WR WKH IRUXP VWDWH DVLGH
from the presence of its subsidiary. Even then, Viasystems only owned an 
attenuated share of EPI²³a two-steps-removed 28±SHUFHQW LQWHUHVW´203 On 
WKHVHIDFWVSURELQJWKHPHDQLQJRI³DWKRPH´ZDVVLPSO\XQQHFHVVDU\,n-
stead, the court only pointed to Goodyear as standing for the broad proposi-
tion that general jurisdiction is reserved for rare cases²a proposition con-
VLVWHQWZLWK H[LVWLQJ FDVH ODZ 7KXV ZKDWHYHU WKH SUHFLVHPHDQLQJ RI ³DW
KRPH´ WKH(LJKWK&LUFXLW DQG WKH 6XSUHPH&RXUW RI$UNDQVDV KDYH Dp-
plied Goodyear to reaffirm that general jurisdiction is a high threshold to 
overcome, and the case does not portend a significant shift in general-
jurisdiction analysis. The court and practitioners will continue to use Perkins 
and Helicopteros as general-jurisdiction guideposts. 
C. Stream-of-Commerce in the Eighth Circuit Before and After Nicastro
While the impact of Goodyear DQG LWV³DW-KRPH´ WHVWRQSUDFWLWLRQHUV
and courts within Arkansas and the Eighth Circuit is minimal, general-
jurisdiction still remains a high threshold to overcome. As general jurisdic-
tion may properly be reserved for exceptional cases, Arkansas practitioners 
may necessarily come to rely more heavily on pleading specific jurisdiction 
and stream-of-commerce in particular with regard to products liability. In so 
doing, they will have to confront Nicastro and courts will have to assess its 
precedential value. 
Arkansas case law analyzing stream-of-commerce post-Asahi is scarce, 
and Arkansas courts will presumably look to the Eighth Circuit for guid-
203. Viasystems, 646 F.3d at 597.
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ance. The Eighth Circuit has adopted an approach that holds foreign end-
product manufacturers subject to personal jurisdiction based on their use of 
expansive distribution schemes that target the American market as a whole 
but no one state in particular.204  Such an approach is in direct conflict with 
the plurality opinion in Nicastro. 
Despite the conflict, this section concludes that the Eighth Circuit need 
not and should not change course. After briefly discussing the Eighth Cir-
FXLW¶V FXUUHQW VWUHDP-of-commerce approach,205 this section analyzes other 
MXULVGLFWLRQV¶ LQWHUSUHWDWLRQV RI Nicastro to date, noting that an emerging 
majority has tempered its precedential value and continue to apply pre-
Nicastro stream-of-commerce approaches.206 By following the reasoning of 
these courts, the Eighth Circuit can continue to exert personal jurisdiction 
over foreign manufacturers at the head of distribution networks. Moreover, 
as this section concludes, the court should continue to adhere to its existing 
approach, as it best comports with realities of modern commerce while re-
maining faithful to principles underlying specific-jurisdiction doctrine. 
1. 7KH(LJKWK&LUFXLW¶V&XUUHQW6WUHDP-of-Commerce Approach 
In the wake of Asahi, the Eighth Circuit adopted and adhered to Justice 
2¶&RQQRU¶VVWUHDP-of-commerce-plus test, requiring some additional show-
ing that the non-resident defendant purposely targeted the forum state in 
order to support personal jurisdiction.207 In Barone v. Rich Brothers Inter-
state Display Fireworks Company,208 however, the Eighth Circuit departed 
from precedent and adopted a more relaxed, stream-of-commerce approach. 
In Barone, the Nebraska-based plaintiff, Bernard Barone, sued both 
Hosoya Fireworks Company, a Japanese manufacturer of fireworks, and its 
South Dakota-based distributor, Rich Brothers Interstate Display Fireworks 
Company, for injuries he suffered when a Fourth of July fireworks display 
he had arranged went awry.209 The Nebraska District Court dismissed the 
suit for lack of personal jurisdiction, but the Eighth Circuit reversed, holding 
that Hosoya could properly be haled into court in Nebraska consistent with 
due process.210 At the outset, the court noted that Hosoya had no physical 
204. See infra Part III.C.1. 
205. See infra Part III.C.1. 
206. See infra Part III.D. 
207. See Timothy C. Lynch, Roman Candles and Bottle Rockets: The Eighth Circuit 
Blows Up the ³Stream of Commerce Plus´ Analysis in Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Dis-
play Fireworks, Inc., 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1371, 1405 (1996) (describing cases in which the 
Eighth Circuit applied the more exacting stream-of-commerce-plus test). 
208. Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 614 (8th Cir. 
1994). 
209. Id. at 610±11. 
210. Id. at 615. 
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presence in Nebraska, no registered agent, no subsidiary, and it neither ad-
vertised nor sold its products directly in the forum state.211 Nonetheless, the 
SURFHVVE\ZKLFK+RVR\D¶VILUHZRUNVFDPHLQWR1HEUDVNDVXIILFHGWRFRQIHU
personal jurisdiction. 212
In the years preceding the accident that injured Mr. Barone, Hosoya 
engaged nine different distributors in six states to sell its products within the 
United States.213 Combined, the nine American distributors comprised an 
average of seventy perceQWRI+RVR\D¶VILUHZRUNVEXVLQHVVDQGGLGVRHIIHc-
tively throughout the country.214 The South Dakota-based distributor, Rich 
Bros., purchased an average of $100,000 annually from Hosoya and approx-
imately sixteen percent of those fireworks made their way to Nebraska every 
year.215 Based on these facts, the court concluded that Hosoya employed a 
select number of strategically located distributors to reach as much of the 
FRXQWU\DVSRVVLEOH$VVXFKWKHFRXUWGHWHUPLQHGWKDW³+RVR\DUHDSHG
the benefits of its network of distributors, and it is only reasonable and just 
WKDWLWVKRXOGQRZEHKHOGDFFRXQWDEOHLQWKHIRUXPRIWKHSODLQWLII¶VFKRLFH
´216
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Clune v. Alimak 
AB.217 In Clune, the court reversed a loZHUFRXUW¶VILQGLQJWKDW$OLPDN$%D
Swedish corporation that designed and manufactured construction hoists, 
lacked sufficient minimum contacts necessary to confer specific jurisdic-
tion.218 Alimak maintained exclusive distribution agreements with American 
distributors; in fact, an American consumer could only purchase a construc-
tion hoist through the American distributors.219 Between 20 and 40 of the 
700 hoists sold in the United States ended up in the forum state of Mis-
souri.220 Based on the facts, the court deHPHG$OLPDN¶VFRQWDFWVVXIILFLHQWO\
purposeful even though it did not target Missouri particularly.221 The fact 
that it used two distributors to sell its products to every state sufficed for the 
court to confer jurisdiction.222
211. Id. at 611. 
212. Id. at 613±14. 
213. Id. at 611. 
214. Barone, 25 F.3d at 611. 
215. Id.  
216. Id. at 615. 
217. Clune v. Alimak AB, 233 F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 2001). 
218. Id. at 540. 
219. Id. at 543±44. 
220. Id. 
221. Id. at 544. 
222. Id. 
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D. Other Jurisdictions Have Limited the Precedential Impact of Nicastro 
As both Clune and Barone GHPRQVWUDWH WKH(LJKWK&LUFXLW¶VDSSOLFa-
tion of stream-of-commerce theory is at odds with the plurality in Nicastro.
While the Eighth Circuit has not confronted the impact of Nicastro yet, oth-
er jurisdictions have and have concluded that it has done little to change 
existing precedent. 
At least one jurisdiction has summarily asserted that Nicastro is limited 
to its facts.223 Others have similarly limited its impact by distinguishing the 
facts necessary to support a finding of sufficient contacts.224 These jurisdic-
tions have noted that J. McIntyre only had three contacts with New Jersey: 
the relationship with the independent U.S. distributor to market its products; 
the regular attendance of company executives at conventions held in Ameri-
ca but none in New Jersey; and the four machines that found their way into 
the forum state.225 Thus, courts have upheld the assertion of specific jurisdic-
tion where the facts evinced more substantial sales made within the forum 
223. See Ainsworth v. Cargotec USA, Inc., No. 2:10-CV-236-KS-MTP, 2011 WL 
6291812, at *2, *4 (S.D. Miss. Dec. 15, 2011), aff¶d sub. nom. Ainsworth v. Moffett Eng¶g, 
Ltd., 716 F.3d 174 (5th Cir. 2013) (concluding that ³Justice Breyer¶s . . . [Nicastro] opinion 
was only applicable to cases presenting the same factual scenario as that case,´ and asserting 
that . . . ³[Nicastro] has little to no precedential value.´). 
224. See Adam N. Steinman, The Meaning of McIntyre, 18 SW. J. INT¶L L. 417, 427±28 
(2012) (collecting cases that have analyzed Nicastro). 
225. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2786 (2011). 
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state226 and where the defendant used a distribution chain that directly tar-
geted a forum state for sales of its products.227
A majority of courts, however, have resolved Nicastro based on a pro-
cedural rule²the Marks rule. According to the Marks rule³>Z@KHQDIUDg-
mented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result 
HQMR\VWKHDVVHQWRIILYH-XVWLFHVµWKHKROGLQJRIWKH&RXUWPD\EHYLHZHG
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on 
the narrowest grounds.¶´228 Applying this rule, a growing number of juris-
GLFWLRQVKDYHGHHPHG-XVWLFH%UH\HU¶VFRQFXUUHQFHDVUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKH
narrowest grounds supporting the holding.229 As the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit explained: 
[T]he crux RI-XVWLFH%UH\HU¶VFRQFXUUHQFHZDVWKDWWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶V
framework applying the stream-of-commerce theory²including the con-
flicting articulations of that theory in Asahi²had not changed, and that 
WKHGHIHQGDQW¶V DFWLYLWLHV LQ0F,QW\UH IDLOHG WR establish personal juris-
diction under any articulation of that theory. Because McIntyre did not 
produce a majority opinion, we must [apply the Marks rule and] follow 
226. See, e.g., King v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 5:11-CV-2269-AKK, 2012 WL 1340066, 
at *7 (N.D. Ala. Apr. 18, 2012) (asserting specific jurisdiction because ³>u]nlike the manu-
facturer in . . . [Nicastro] who utilized an independent U.S. distributor that merely distributed 
four machines to the state of New Jersey, GM Canada utilized its parent corporation to dis-
tribute hundreds, if not thousands, of vehicles to the state of Alabama, including the vehicle 
at issue.´); Russell v. SNFA, No. 1-09-3012, 2011 WL 6965795, at *8 (Ill. App. Dec. 16, 
2011) (noting that ³approximately 2,198´ of the defendant¶s parts had been sold in Illinois 
between 2000 and 2007 and ³[t]hus, insufficient sales is not an issue in the case before us, as 
it was in . . . [Nicastro].´); Graham v. Hamilton, No. 3:11-609, 2012 WL 893748, at *4 
(W.D. La. Mar. 15, 2012) (distinguishing the one machine that ended up in New Jersey in 
Nicastro with ³. . . evidence demonstrating that GM Canada places over 800,000 vehicles 
into the U.S. market each year, indicating that many of GM Canada¶s vehicles would likely 
be sold in Louisiana.´); Dierig v. Lees Leisure Indus., Ltd., No. 11-125-DLB-JGW, 2012 WL 
669968, at *11 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 28, 2012) (upholding specific jurisdiction, noting that ³in 
contrast . . . [to Nicastro], the facts here demonstrate that Defendant Lees Leisure has adver-
tised in, sent goods to, and targeted the Commonwealth of Kentucky in efforts to market and 
sell its products.´); Merced v. Gemstar Grp., Inc., No. 10-3054, 2011 WL 5865964, at *5 n.1 
(E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2011) (finding Nicastro factually dissimilar because there ³the defendant 
never made a single shipment to the forum state,´ but ³[i]n the present case, the Margraf 
[d]efendants have made at least three-including the one giving rise to this litigation.´). 
227. See, e.g., Original Creations, Inc. v. Ready Am., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 2d 711, 717 
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (³In contrast [to . . . Nicastro], Life+Gear has sold its products to two distrib-
utors that market to Illinois residents . . . The distribution network Life+Gear has utilized 
within Illinois is far afield from Justice Kennedy¶s example of the owner of the small farm 
who has no control over distribution channels for her crops.´). 
228. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)). 
229. See, e.g., Ainsworth v. Moffet Eng¶g, Ltd. 716 F.3d 174, 178 (5th Cir. 2013); 
AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Willemsen 
v. Invacare Corp., 282 P.3d 867, 873 (Or. 2012) (en banc). 
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the narrowest holding among the plurality opinions in that case. The nar-
rowest holding is WKDWZKLFKFDQEHGLVWLOOHGIURP-XVWLFH%UH\HU¶VFRn-
currence²that the law remains the same after McIntyre.230
Following this trend, a growing number of other jurisdictions have em-
ployed similar reasoning, concluding that their pre-Nicastro stream-of-
commerce jurisprudence remains binding.231 Indeed, at least one district 
FRXUW ZLWKLQ WKH FLUFXLW KDV DOUHDG\ GHWHUPLQHG WKDW ³>Nicastro] did not 
FKDQJHWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQDOIUDPHZRUN´QHFHVVLWDWLQJDSSOi-
FDWLRQRI³(LJKWK&LUFXLWFDVHODZLQWHUSUHWLQJWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VH[LVWLQJ
stream of FRPPHUFHSUHFHGHQW´232
E. The Eighth Circuit Should Adhere to Its Pre-Nicastro Stream-of-
Commerce Jurisprudence 
The Eighth Circuit should follow the trend among other jurisdictions 
that continue to apply their pre-Nicastro approach to stream-of-commerce 
theory for two primary reasons. First, it better reflects the realities of mod-
ern global commerce. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her Nicastro dissent, the 
³FDVHLVLOOXVWUDWLYHRIPDUNHWLQJDUUDQJHPHQWVIRUVDOHVLQWhe United States 
230. AFTG-TG, 689 F.3d at 1363 (citations omitted). 
231. See, e.g., id. (³Because [Nicastro] did not produce a majority opinion, we must fol-
low the narrowest holding among the plurality opinions in that case. The narrowest holding is 
that which can be distilled from Justice Breyer¶s concurrence²that the law remains the same 
after . . . [Nicastro].´ (citations omitted)); In re Chinese Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 894 F. Supp. 2d 819, 849 (E.D. La. 2012) (³Justice Breyer¶s concurrence, the govern-
ing decision, expressly requires the application of existing Supreme Court precedent on spe-
cific personal jurisdiction, leaving unaltered the . . . [pre-Nicastro] jurisprudence relied upon 
by the Fifth Circuit. Thus, the Court applies the Fifth Circuit¶s law as informed by Supreme 
Court precedent on specific personal jurisdiction and the stream-of-commerce doctrine.´); 
Windsor v. Spinner Indus. Co., 825 F. Supp. 2d 632, 638 (D. Md.), as amended (Dec. 15, 
2011) (³This Court therefore construes [Nicastro] as rejecting the foreseeability standard of 
personal jurisdiction, but otherwise leaving the legal landscape untouched. The Court will 
therefore return to this circuit¶s post-Asahi precedents to resolve this case.´); Frito-Lay N. 
Am., Inc. v. Medallion Foods, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 2d 859, 867 (E.D. Tex. 2012) (invoking the 
Marks rule to hold that ³Justice Breyer¶s concurrence is the controlling opinion of the Su-
preme Court´ and that ³Justice Breyer specifically declined to announce a new rule in stream 
of commerce cases.´); Eskridge v. Pac. Cycle, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-00615, 2012 WL 1036826, 
at *4 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 27, 2012) (³Because Nicastro did not produce a majority opinion 
adopting either Justice O¶Connor¶s or Justice Brennan¶s stream of commerce theory, and 
given Justice Breyer¶s reliance on current Supreme Court precedent, post-Asahi Fourth Cir-
cuit case law remains binding.´) (citing Windsor v. Spinner Indus. Co., 825 F. Supp. 2d 632, 
638 (D. Md. 2011)). 
232. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Steris Corp., No. 11-CV-00078 (SRN/AJB), 2012 WL 5187790, at 
*6 (D. Minn. Oct. 19, 2012). 
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FRPPRQ LQ WRGD\¶V FRPPHUFLDO ZRUOG´233 Indeed, foreign end-product 
manufacturers regularly employ American distributors for practical, eco-
nomic, and cultural reasons.234 The Nicastro SOXUDOLW\¶V VXJJHVWHG IUDPe-
work, however, fails to account for this fact. Worse, it permits a foreign 
manufacturer to easily escape personal jurisdiction based on it. Indeed, to 
avoid the jurisdiction of the American courts, an informed lawyer need only 
provide a few words of advice to its foreign client: first, design and produce 
the product for no particular state market; second, do not make direct sales; 
third, hire an independent domestic distributor to sell within the entirety of 
the United States as opposed to a particular state. If the Nicastro plurality 
controlled and the client followed this advice, there is a good chance it could 
avoid jurisdiction. As a result, there is also a built-in disincentive to target a 
discrete state, as under the Nicastro SOXUDOLW\¶V IUDPHZRUN WKH HQWLW\ FDQ
maximize its market penetration while avoiding the cost of litigation. 
The Court has emphasized that its specific jurisprudence must evolve 
contemporaneously with commercial practices.235 7KH(LJKWK&LUFXLW¶VGHFi-
sion in Barone represents such an evolution. The Barone court reasoned that 
³>L@QWKLVDJHRI1$)7$DQG*$77RQHFDQH[SHFWIXUWKHUJOREDOL]DWLRQRI
commerce, and it is only reasonable for companies that distribute allegedly 
defective products through regional distributors in this country to anticipate 
being haled into FRXUWE\SODLQWLIIVLQWKHLUKRPHVWDWHV´236 Because foreign 
manufacturers can and do maximize their sales by treating the U.S. market 
as whole, without targeting a particular state, personal jurisdiction cannot be 
predicated on an outmoded conception of commercial practices. 
,Q DGGLWLRQ WR WKH IRUHJRLQJ WKH(LJKWK&LUFXLW¶V DSSURDFKEHVW FRm-
ports with purposeful availment. As discussed previously, personal jurisdic-
tion requires a finding that the defendant deliberately committed an act to 
avail itself of the market in the forum state. Thus, the purposeful availment 
requirement entails more than foreseeability, it necessitates a degree of in-
tent and control. When a foreign manufacturer selects, organizes, and uses a 
network of American-based distributors to sell its products across the coun-
try, to every state but no state in particular, logic dictates that it intends to 
avail itself of the forums in which its product actually enter. 
233. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2799 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). 
234. Kojo Yelpaala, Strategy and Planning in Global Product Distribution-Beyond the 
Distribution Contract, 25 LAW & POL¶Y INT¶L BUS. 839, 871 (1994). 
235. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292±93 (1980); 
(citing McGee v. Int¶l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)); McGee, 355 U.S. at 222 (1957) 
(³Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is clearly discernible toward ex-
panding the permissible scope of state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other non-
residents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national econo-
my over the years.´). 
236. Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 615 (1994). 
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7KH(LJKWK&LUFXLW¶VH[LVWLQJSUHFHGHQW UHIOHFWV WKLV ORJLF ,QBarone,
the defendant Hosoya argued that it did not intend or know that its products 
ZRXOGUHDFK1HEUDVNDGHVSLWHWKHVWDWH¶VFORVHSUR[LPLW\WRWKH6RXWK'a-
kota distributor.237 7KHFRXUWGLVPLVVHG+RVR\D¶VLJQRUDQFHGHIHQVH,WQRWHG
that the South Dakota-distributor ZDV³FRQYHQLHQWO\ORFDWHG´FORVHWRWKUHH
other states, including Nebraska.238 In addition, the court noted that each of 
+RVR\D¶VGLVWULEXWRUVZDVVWUDWHJLFDOO\ORFDWHGWRUHDFKQXPHURXVVWDWHVDQG
their locations were unlikely the result of mere chance.239 Instead, the court 
FRQFOXGHG WKDW WKH GLVWULEXWLRQ VFKHPH FRQVWLWXWHG ³HYLGHQFH RI +RVR\D¶V
efforts to place its products in the stream of commerce throughout the Mid-
ZHVWDQGRWKHUSDUWVRI WKHFRXQWU\DVZHOO´240 Thus, it was not only fore-
seeable to Hosoya that its South Dakota distributor would penetrate neigh-
boring Nebraska with its fireworks, it was purposeful and planned. 
More pointedly, in Clune, the court concluded the defendant purpose-
fully availed itself of the forum state by virtue of the distribution network it 
set up to sell construction hoists across the country.241 Through that distribu-
tion network, the court concluded that the manufacturer both knew and in-
WHQGHG LWV SURGXFW WR HQWHU WKH IRUXP VWDWH GHVSLWH WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V DUJu-
ments to the contrary: ³,IZHZHUH WRFRQFOXGH WKDWGHVSLWH LWVGLVWULEXWLRQ
system, [the defendant] did not intend its products to flow into [the forum 
state], we would be bound to the conclusion that the company did not intend 
its products to flow into any of the United SWDWHV´242 Thus, logic dictates 
that purposeful availment is satisfied when a manufacturer sells its products 
through a distribution network that targets sales in every state. 
,Q DGGLWLRQ XQGHU WKH (LJKWK &LUFXLW¶V FXUUHQW IUDPHZRUN D IRUHLJQ
manufacturer utilizing a domestic distribution network can easily take steps 
to avoid availing itself of the forum market, thereby avoiding jurisdiction. In 
Barone, the court noted that a foreign manufacturer that selects a discrete 
few distributors for the purpose of selling in specific states but not others 
may limit its exposure to adjudicatory authority. 243 To do this, a manufac-
turer need only make it a condition of the distribution agreement that the 
distributors not market to specific states.244 Further, it could require indem-
nification for the distributors.245 Such evidence that the manufacturer affirm-
237. Id. at 613. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. at 614.
241. Clune v. Alimak AB, 233 F.3d 538, 544±45 (8th Cir. 2000). 
242. Id. at 544. 
243. Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610, 615 (1994). 
244. Noyes, supra note 142, at 92. 
245. Stewart E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1163, 
1167±68 (2013). 
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atively sought to prevent the distribution of its products from entering the 
forum state would militate against exercising specific jurisdiction based on 
the absence of purposeful availment.246 By the same token, evidence that the 
manufacturer could have but did not restrict its sales should satisfy purpose-
ful availment.247
Finally, fairness and reciprocity principles require holding foreign 
manufacturers at the head of domestic distribution chains subject to personal 
jurisdiction in those states in which its product injures consumers. Emanat-
ing from International Shoe WKH&RXUW¶VVSHFLILFMXULVGLFWLRQMXULVSUXGHQFH
has long emphasized fundamental fairness: 
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting 
activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws 
of that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations; 
and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the ac-
tivities within the state, a procedure which [sic] requires the corporation 
to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hard-
ly be said to be undue.
248
The foregoing embodies a quid pro quo: in return for the privilege of 
conducting activities in the forum state, the entity subjects itself to the state 
FRXUW¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ 7KXV SHUVRQDO MXULVGLFWLRQ LV SURSHU ZKHQ WKH HQWLW\
benefits from its deliberate contacts with the forum state. Unlike the 
Nicastro pluraOLW\ WKH (LJKWK &LUFXLW¶V DSSURDFK UHPDLQV IDLWKIXO WR WKLV
principle. Not only does it recognize that sellers at the top of distribution 
FKDLQV UHDS WKH EHQHILW RI HDFK VWDWH¶V ODZV LW UHFRJQL]HV WKDW WKH\ HQMR\
³WKHPXFKJUHDWHUHFRQRPLFEHQHILWRIPXOWLSOHVDOHVLQGLVWDQW IRUXPV´249
Because distribution chains allow foreign manufacturers to maximize their 
profits and market penetration, fairness mandates that they submit to per-
sonal jurisdiction in the forum where their product causes injury. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Breyer left open the possibility that the Court might refashion 
its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence in light of modern commercial con-
cerns in an appropriate case in the future,250 and commentators have 
246. Clune, 233 F.3d at 544. 
247. Noyes, supra note 142, at 99. 
248. Int¶l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945). 
249. Clune, 233 F.3d at 543 (citing Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks 
Co., 25 F.3d 610, 613 (8th Cir. 1994)). 
250. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2794 (2011) (Breyer, J., con-
curring) (³At a minimum, I would not work such a change to the law in the way either the 
plurality or the New Jersey Supreme Court suggests without a better understanding of the 
relevant contemporary commercial circumstances. Insofar as such considerations are relevant 
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acknowledged the possibility of both state and federal legislation to accom-
plish this purpose.251
For the time being, however, Arkansas practitioners and courts are left 
to grapple with the still muddied state of personal jurisdiction landscape. 
Although the Goodyear Court spoke with a unanimous voice, the case in 
HIIHFWDGGVOLWWOHWRWKHGHDUWKRIDXWKRULW\7KHDPELJXRXV³DW-KRPH´VWDQd-
ard has limited its utility and neither the Supreme Court of Arkansas nor the 
Eighth Circuit has shifted its approach regarding general jurisdiction in the 
wake of Goodyear. Instead, the courts continue to use Perkins and 
Helicopteros, as well as their own precedent, to assess whether general ju-
risdiction is appropriate. In this sense, Goodyear is simply an affirmation of 
the narrow scope of general jurisdiction. 
Given the limitations of general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction, espe-
cially stream-of-commerce theory, takes on renewed importance for Arkan-
sas practitioners seeking personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant. 
While Nicastro arguably curtailed the contours of specific jurisdiction, a 
number of lower courts have subsequently disregarded or distinguished its 
precedential value. As a result, many of those jurisdictions have adhered to 
their pre-Nicastro stream-of-commerce precedents. Without clear and con-
trary direction from the Supreme Court, the Eighth Circuit should follow 
this trend and continue to hold foreign manufacturers at the top of distribu-
tion chains subject to personal jurisdiction when their defective products 
purposefully and regularly flow into a forum state and cause injury to con-
sumers there. To hold otherwise would not only ignore the reality of modern 
commercial practices, it would unfairly permit foreign defendants to escape 
the adjudicatory authority of the courts and, in turn, accountability to Amer-
ican consumers. 
Kathy McCarroll
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251. See Hoffheimer, supra note 183, at 605±09 (discussing the possibility of state or 
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